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Abstract— Machine learning models are vulnerable to
adversarial examples. An adversary modifies the input data
such that humans still assign the same label, however, ma-
chine learning models misclassify it. Previous approaches
in the literature demonstrated that adversarial examples
can even be generated for the remotely hosted model. In
this paper, we propose a Siamese network based approach
to generate adversarial examples for a multiclass target
CNN. We assume that the adversary do not possess any
knowledge of the target data distribution, and we use an
unlabeled mismatched dataset to query the target, e.g., for
the ResNet-50 target, we use the Food-101 dataset as the
query. Initially, the target model assigns labels to the query
dataset, and a Siamese network is trained on the image
pairs derived from these multiclass labels. We learn the
adversarial perturbations for the Siamese model and show
that these perturbations are also adversarial w.r.t. the target
model. In experimental results, we demonstrate effective-
ness of our approach on MNIST, CIFAR-10 and ImageNet
targets with TinyImageNet/Food-101 query datasets.
I. INTRODUCTION AND RELATED WORKS
Machine learning models are vulnerable to external
attacks such as adversarial inputs. The examples from
the dataset can be perturbed in a manner that a hu-
man assigns the same label to it, however, it machine
learning models to misclassify it. Such examples are
referred to as the Adversarial examples. Szegedy et al.
[1] proposed a box-constraint optimization to obtain the
adversarial samples from the input images. In addition,
it was observed that the same perturbation causes
different networks trained on different subsets of the
dataset to misclassify the same input. Thus, adversarial
examples are transferable between the models trained
on similar data distribution. Goodfellow et. al. [2]
proposed fast gradient sign (FGS) method for gener-
ating adversarial examples. Small input perturbations
that maximize the loss, locally, produce images that
are more often misclassified by the network. It was
argued that the primary cause of the vulnerability of
neural networks to adversarial perturbation is their
linear nature. Moosavi et al. [3] discovered the exis-
tence of a universal (image-agnostic) perturbation that
causes natural images to be misclassified with high
probability. The existence of universal perturbations
point towards the geometric correlations among the
high-dimensional decision boundary of classifiers. It
underlines the existence of single directions in the input
space that adversaries can possibly exploit to enforce a
classifier to make mistakes on natural images.
Fig. 1. Example of an adversarial image generated by our approach
for RESNET-50 model.
Adversarial examples pose a potential threat to ma-
chine learning models when deployed in the real
world. Since these perturbations tend to go undetected
by the humans, it becomes difficult to rectify them.
Kurakin et al. [4] showed that even in physical-world
scenarios, machine learning systems are vulnerable to
adversarial examples. It was demonstrated that a large
fraction of the adversarial examples obtained from a
cell-phone camera get misclassified by the ImageNet
Inception model.
It was believed that the adversarial samples can only
be generated when we have an access to the target
model. However, Papernot et al. [5] demonstrated that
the adversarial examples can even be generated for the
remotely hosted deep neural network (DNN) with no
knowledge of the architectural of the DNN, such as the
number, type, and size of layers, nor of the training
data used to learn the DNN’s parameters. The only
access their adversary has to the target model is the
(atomic) class label of the submitted query vector. They
refer to this setting as the black-box scenario. Starting
with a small subset of a training set, a Jacobian-based
dataset augmentation technique is used to effectively
learn the decision boundary with the limited number
of queries made to the target DNN.
In this paper, we propose an approach based on
Siamese networks [6][7] to generate adversarial ex-
amples for the target classification model. Instead of
learning the decision boundary of the target model,
we directly learn the input perturbation that changes
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the label of the images. We use Siamese networks
to learn such adversarial perturbation and show its
effectiveness in generating adversarial examples for
the target model. We use an unlabeled mismatched
image dataset as query to the target convolutional
neural network (CNN). We refer to the mismatched
dataset as the ”stimulus”. Kulkarni et al. [8] showed the
effectiveness of mismatched stimulus for knowledge
distillation. We input the stimulus dataset to the target
model and obtain the corresponding class labels. Based
on the similarity and dissimilarity of the assigned la-
bels, we generate positive and negative image pairs for
training the Siamese network. We learn the adversarial
perturbations for the Siamese network using the FSG
method [2] in which perturbations are applied only to
the left image channel of the network to ’switch’ the
original label. We apply the learned perturbations to
the target images and show that they act as adversarial
perturbations.
Our experimental setting is similar to [5] with a few
differences. Instead of remote DNN APIs, we demon-
strate results with pretrained CNN models. Also, we do
not assume availability of the subset of original training
set. Through the use of the Siamese network, we utilize
the notion that the target CNN assigns different labels
to different stimulus images, which enables the net-
work to infer the adversarial ”directions” in the input
space. In the experimental section, we demonstrate
effectiveness of our approach on MNIST, CIFAR-10
and ImageNet pretrained models as targets. We use
subset of TinyImageNet [9] [10] and Food-101 [11] as
the stimulus for these targets.
II. PROPOSED METHODOLOGY
This section describes our approach to generate ad-
versarial examples for the target CNN.
A. Training Siamese networks
Siamese networks [6][7] are well known architectures
for learning data representations. The training objec-
tive minimizes a loss function such that the features
representing images from the same class have higher
similarity whereas features for the images of different
classes have low similarity. The mapping from the
raw images to the feature space is facilitated by a
convolutional network. They are proved to be efficient
tools for learning the feature representation when the
amount of labeled data is limited.
Since we do not assume knowledge of the target
data distribution, we use an unlabeled mismatched
dataset as the stimulus for the target model. During
the experiments, for the MNIST target, we use TinyIm-
ageNet whereas for CIFAR-10 and ResNet targets, we
use Food-101 as the stimulus. Initially, we get a small
stimulus dataset labeled by the target CNN. To limit
the number of queries, for each of our experiments, we
only make 5k queries to the target CNN and collect the
Fig. 2. Siamese architecture for learning the adversarial perturba-
tion.
corresponding class labels. Since with n image queries,
we can generate n
2
2 − n unique image pairs, we can
effectively train the Siamese network with a lower risk
of overfitting.
Let fT denotes the function of the target CNN. Let
z ∈ [1, .., k] denote the label returned by the target
model for the input x. Since the target is the classi-
fication model, z is obtained as follows:
zx = arg max fT(x) (1)
It is feasible that the labels assigned to the stimulus
may not cover all the possible classes that are present
in the target training set. Since Siamese networks work
on similarity/dissimilarity of the labels, this does not
create an issue. To avoid the possible class imbalance
by random sampling, we generate an equal number
of positive and negative pairs using the following
procedure:
• Randomly pick a class from the stimulus labels.
• For that class, collect one positive and one negative
example.
• Iterate until the desired number of pairs are col-
lected.
For training the Siamese network, we use a strategy
similar to the one-shot learning approach proposed in
[6] where the L1 difference of the left and the right
channel image representations is taken prior to the sig-
moid unit. Fig. 2 shows an overview of the architecture
of our Siamese network. Let xL and xR denote the input
to the Left and to the Right subnetwork, respectively.
Let y denotes the ground truth label. If xL and xR
belong to the same class, then y = 1, else y = 0. Let
fS denotes the function represented by the Siamese. fS
takes two images (xL and xR) as the input and assigns
a label to it as follows:
ypred =
{
1, if fS(xL, xR) >= 0.5
0, otherwise
Here, ypred denotes the label predicted for the given
input image pair. The network is trained with the
binary cross entropy loss. Let Li denotes the loss for
the ith sample
Li = −yi log yipred − (1− yi) log (1− yipred) (2)
We use 10% of the training pairs as the validation
set and the training is terminated when the model’s
performance ceases to improve on the validation set.
B. Adversarial perturbations for Siamese
Our aim is to produce the minimally altered example
of an image x, say x∗, such that the target model mis-
classifies the example, i.e.
x∗ = x+ δ s.t. arg max fT(x) 6= arg max fT(x∗) (3)
However, we do not have access to fT , and we now
use the trained fS as the proxy. We learn the adversarial
perturbations for fS and show that, they are transferable
w.r.t. the target model function fT .
To generate adversarial examples for the Siamese
network, we resort to the FSG method [2]. Since we
have two images as input and a binary label as output,
our attempt is to flip the label of the given input pair.
We take the gradient of xL w.r.t. the output of the
network, i.e., fS(xL, xR). We iteratively modify xL so as
to flip the initial estimated label. If initial value of ypred
is 0, we need to perform the gradient ascent to flip it
to 1. If initially, ypred is 1, we need to perform gradient
descent to flip the label. To facilitate the switch between
the ascent and the descent, we use the following update
equation:
xL = xL + eS sign(0.5− ypred) ∂ fS∂xL (4)
Here, eS denotes the weight assigned to the gradi-
ent. Note that the term sign(0.5− ypred), automatically
choses the ascent or descent appropriately. As opposed
to FSG for the multiclass case, which takes the gradient
w.r.t. to the loss, we directly take the gradient w.r.t. the
model output.
The perturbation that resulted from the label flip is
then obtained as
xg = xL − xinitL (5)
Here, xinitL denotes the initial value of xL. The procedure
is described in the Algorithm 1 block.
Algorithm 1 Learning adversarial perturbations using
Siamese
1: INPUTS: xL, xR, y, eS, max iter
2: OUTPUT: adversarial perturbation: xg
3: Initialization: xg = 0, xinitL = xL
4: ypred = I( fS(xL, xR) >= 0.5)
5: if ypred = y then
6: for iter = 1 to max iter do
7: xL = xL + eS sign(0.5− ypred) ∂ fS∂xL
8: ypred = I( fS >= 0.5)
9: if ypred 6= y :
10: xg = xL - xinitL
11: break
For MNIST and CIFAR-10 experiments, we use eS =
0.001. For ImageNet, we use eS = 1. We use max iter =
100 for all experiments.
C. Generating adversarial examples for target model
We perturb target samples using xg as follows:
xP = xT + eT sign(xg) (6)
Here xT denotes the sample from the target dataset
and xP denotes the perturbed sample. eT denotes the
scale factor for the signed perturbation. We define the
transfer rate Tr as the percentage of labels changed by
the learned perturbation:
Tr =
N
∑
i=1
I(zixP 6= zixT )
N
(7)
Here, N denotes the size of the target set and I denotes
the indicator function whose output is 1 if the condition
is true; else the output is 0. Note that our aim is to
change the label of the target image that was previously
assigned by the target model. The modified label can
be any possible class.
To more effectively learn the xg, we generate a small
set of test image pairs and obtain the perturbation for
each by following the procedure described in Algo-
rithm 1. We demonstrate that the perturbations that
cause the maximum change in the loss (of the Siamese
network) with the smallest infinity (max) norm, has
the best transfer rate. We score each perturbation as
follows:
sj = (Lj
xinitL +x
j
g
− Lj
xinitL
)/||xjg||∞ (8)
Here, sj denotes the score value assigned for the jth
perturbation. We rank perturbations in descending or-
der of the the score value. We use the highest-ranked
perturbation to generate the adversarial examples for
the target set. In the experimental section, we demon-
strate the validity and the effectiveness of our scoring
function.
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Fig. 3. Experiments with MNIST and CIFAR targets. (a) Adversarial images misclassified by the MNIST target for eT = 0.2; (b) comparison
of transfer rates for the top, the bottom and the random perturbation for MNIST target; (c) adversarial images misclassified by the CIFAR
target for eT = 0.1; (d) comparison of transfer rates for top, the bottom and the random perturbation for CIFAR target showing that the top
ranked perturbations always have the higher transfer rate; (e) histogram of stimulus labels assigned by the MNIST target;(f) histogram of
stimulus labels assigned by the CIFAR target.
III. EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS
We demonstrate effectiveness of our approach on
pretrained target models trained on MNIST, CIFAR-10
and ImageNet datasets.
A. MNIST CNN target
The MNIST dataset consists of gray-scale images of
size 28× 28 consisting of handwritten digits. We use
a pretrained network as the MNIST target, which has
Fig. 4. Adversarial images for ResNet-50. The center image
shows the learned adversarial perturbation. Class probabilities are
displayed in green.
approximately 184k parameters and test accuracy of
99.58%. For MNIST target, we use 5k randomly chosen
images from the TinyImageNet dataset [9] [10] as the
stimulus. TinyImageNet is the natural image dataset
and has different data distribution than the MNIST
images. Stimulus images are resized and converted to
gray-scale prior to querying. We obtain the multiclass
labels on the stimulus using the MNIST target. Fig.
3(e) shows the histogram of labels assigned to the 5k
stimulus dataset. Peculiarly, label 8 gets assigned the
most.
We train the Siamese network on 30k image pairs
derived from these labels. From the training data,
we use 10% data as the validation set. The network
architecture that performs well on the validation set
is chosen. The architecture of the subnetwork of the
Siamese is
[Conv(128,5,5)–BatchNorm–MaxPool(2)–
Conv(128,5,5)–BatchNorm–MaxPool(2)–Conv(128,5,5)–
BatchNorm–MaxPool(2)].
We use three convolution layers followed by
batch-normalization and max-pooling layers. Each
convolution layer has 128 filters of size 5× 5. We use a
dense layer of size 512 prior to the sigmoid unit. Our
network has approximately 1.4M parameters. We use
batch-normalization layers and dropout to regularize
the network. We observe that results are fairly robust
against the small changes in the Siamese architecture.
Thereafter, we follow the procedure described in
Algorithm 1 and learn the adversarial perturbations for
a small set of newly generated image pairs. eS is set to
0.001 and max iter is set to 100. We rank the perturba-
tions according to the scoring function defined in Eq. 8.
We use the top-ranked perturbation as xg and perturb
10k images from MNIST test set according to Eq. 6.
Fig. 3(a) shows the adversarial images misclassified by
the MNIST target. Note that we use the MNIST test
set only to demonstrate the results for the adversarial
examples. The MNIST data is not assumed during the
training process.
We now evaluate the effectiveness of our scoring
strategy. We compare the transfer rates for the highest-
(top-) ranked perturbation and the lowest- (bottom-)
ranked perturbation. We also perform a comparison
with a random perturbation to verify the superiority of
learned perturbations. In case of random perturbation,
we use a zero mean and unit standard deviation noise
image as xg. We obtain transfer rates with five random
perturbations and plot the average transfer rate. Fig.
3(b) shows the plots of the transfer rates for different
values of eT . It can be seen that the top-ranked pertur-
bation always performs better than the bottom ranked
one. Also, learned perturbations have higher transfer
rates than the random perturbation.
Though, we get higher transfer rates with larger
values of eT , the perturbation becomes increasingly
visible. We get the transfer rate of 36.48% for eT value
of 0.3. For the similar value of eT , Papernot et al. [5]
report the transfer rate of 78.72% with the query dataset
similar to the target dataset. Although our transfer rate
is lower, it is interesting to note that it is obtained with
a single perturbation applied to the entire test set with
the smaller number of queries of mismatched dataset.
B. CIFAR CNN target
The CIFAR-10 dataset consists of color images of size
32× 32. For this experiment, we use a pretrained target
network which has approximately 776k parameters
and test accuracy of 82.16%. For the CIFAR target, to
have a mismatched set, we use 5k randomly chosen
images from the Food-101 dataset [11] as the stimulus.
The Food-101 dataset consists of images of food items
corresponding to 101 different categories. We obtain
labels on the 5k stimulus set. Fig. 3(f) shows the
histogram of stimulus labels assigned by the CIFAR
target. We generate 70k image pairs from the labeled
stimulus to train the Siamese network. We use the same
architecture for Siamese as for the MNIST experiment.
The network has approximately 1.8M parameters. Fig.
3(c) shows the adversarial examples misclassified by
the CIFAR target. Fig. 3(d) shows the comparison of
transfer rates for the top, the bottom and the random
perturbation. Here as well, for the random perturba-
tion, we report average transfer rate over five different
random perturbations. We observe the similar trend
that the top-ranked perturbation performs the best.
We now study the effect of the training set size
for the Siamese network on the transfer rate. Table I
shows the transfer rates for the MNIST and CIFAR
targets for varied number of input image pairs. We use
five different subsets of test image pairs and calculate
the mean and the standard deviation of the transfer
rates. We observe that transfer rates increase with more
number of pairs. However, we observed that after a
certain number of pairs, transfer rates do not change
significantly.
# image pairs MNIST transfer rate CIFAR transfer rate(Tinyimagenet stim.) (Food-101 stim.)
10k 0.435± 0.074 0.376± 0.026
20k 0.511± 0.055 0.419± 0.038
30k 0.635± 0.059 0.426± 0.06
TABLE I
COMPARISON OF TRANSFER RATES WITH VARYING NUMBER OF
TRAINING IMAGE PAIRS. FOR MNIST TARGET, eT IS SET TO 0.5
WHEREAS FOR CIFAR TARGET, eT IS SET TO 0.1.
Experimental results demonstrate that our approach
is able to learn the adversarial perturbations even
under restricted setting. We observe that a single per-
turbation can be estimated that maximally perturbs the
target set. This underlines the existence of universal
perturbations, which we can effectively learn using
Siamese networks. Next, we qualitatively demonstrate
results of our approach on the pretrained target model
trained on ImageNet dataset.
C. ResNet target
We use a pretrained ResNet-50 model as the target.
For this target as well, we use 5k images from the Food-
101 dataset as the mismatched stimulus. We generate
1M image pairs from the class labels obtained from the
target and train the Siamese network.
The architecture of the Siamese network is
[Conv(128,5,5)–BatchNorm–MaxPool(2)–
Conv(128,5,5)–BatchNorm–MaxPool(2)–Conv(128,5,5)–
BatchNorm–MaxPool(2)–Conv(128,5,5)–BatchNorm–
MaxPool(2)].
Note that, we use a similar architecture to those of
the MNIST and CIFAR experiments where instead of
three, we use four convolution/max pool layers. The
network has approximately 14M parameters. We set
eS = 1 and max iter to 100. Fig. 4 shows the result
of adding a learned adversarial perturbation to input
images. The image in the center shows the highest-
ranked perturbation. Images on the left show the origi-
nal inputs and images on the right show the adversarial
examples. eT is calculated separately for each image.
Note that the same perturbation is able to switch the
label of the inputs. For some images, the effect of the
perturbation is visible in the output image, e.g., for the
green snake image, eT had to be set to 27 to change the
label. However, for most of the images, smaller values
of eT effected the class change. In this case as well,
we observed that our perturbation is superior to the
random perturbation. With the random perturbation, a
much larger value of eT was needed to effect the label
change. Fig 1 shows another example of adversarial
image generated by our approach for the image taken
from [2].
Fig. 5. Experiment with the Google vision API. Left and right
columns show output of the vision API for original and modified
images, respectively.
Since adversarial images are known to be transfer-
able between the models, we performed an experiment
with the Google vision API. Fig. 5 shows the class labels
returned by the vision API for the original images
and the perturbed images generated by our approach.
Perturbed images are misclassified by the vision API.
The result indicates that the adversarial perturbation
directions computed by our approach are effective.
IV. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we proposed an approach based on
Siamese networks to generate adversarial examples
under a black-box setting. Since Siamese networks are
trained on image pairs, with the limited number of
mismatched queries to the target model, we could
effectively learn the adversarial directions in the input
space. We observed that the perturbations that max-
imally alter the loss with minimum max norm are
the most effective. Experiments with MNIST, CIFAR-
10 and ImageNet targets with TinyImageNet and Food-
101 stimulus demonstrated the efficacy of the proposed
approach.
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